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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
PATRICK TILT, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
1 APPELLANTS REPLY 
> BRIEF 
) CaseNo.20030785-CA 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State argues that Appellant failed to demonstrate that current procedural 
safeguards are inadequate to assure the constitutional mandates of due process. However, 
to the contrary, Appellant argued at length in his opening brief that, notwithstanding current 
safeguards, false confessions still occur and innocent people are convicted of crimes to which 
they falsely confessed. Appellant further noted that, where a dispute arises as to what was 
said during an interrogation, courts generally favor the recollection of a police officer over 
that of the accused. Consequently, where there is a dispute, the procedural inadequacies of 
the current system are further compounded. Furthermore, Appellant argued that dicta in 
recent Utah cases, which merely encourages the recording of interrogations, has not remedied 
these procedural infirmities such that a judicially mandated rule under the principles of due 
process is required. For the foregoing reasons, which were all detailed in Appellant's 
opening brief, current procedural safeguards inadequately protect a defendant's right to 
fundamental fairness and due process of law. 
Moreover, there are myriad policy considerations supporting the adoption of a rule 
requiring the recording of confessions. A verbatim recording would protect the rights of the 
accused, it would protect the rights of police officers wrongfully accused of illegal conduct, 
it would protect the interest of the State in presenting compelling video or audio evidence at 
trial, and it would serve the interests of the court in ascertaining the truth of what often 
occurs behind closed doors. The State cites no compelling policy consideration against the 
adoption of such a rule such that, where the rule can be imposed easily and with minimal 
expense, the principles of fundamental fairness require its adoption. 
The State also asserts that the accuracy of the confession in the instant case was not 
disputed. However, Appellant disputed the accuracy of the confession both in substance and 
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as to form. The confession was challenged as being substantively inaccurate in that 
Appellant professed his innocense and presented much evidence to that end. The statement 
was inaccurate in form as Detective Gent admitted under oath that he failed to record certain 
parts of the interrogation and Appellant's attendant statements. Consequently, the State's 
argument that the accuracy of the statement was undisputed is misplaced. 
ARGUMENT 
I. REVERSAL IS WARRANTED WHERE APPELLANT'S 
STATEMENT WAS NOT RECORDED NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
FACT THAT IT WAS TAKEN IN A PLACE OF DETENTION 
WHERE VERBATIM RECORDING WAS FEASIBLE. 
As stated in Appellant's opening brief, Utah courts have long recognized that "no 
other class of evidence is as potentially prejudicial to defendants as confessions." State v. 
Mauchley, 67 P.3d 477, 489-90 (Utah 2003); quoting Stephen A. Saltzburg, Standards of 
Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 271, 293 (1975). "The 
importance o f . . . a tape recording [of a confession] lies in the fact that trial courts and 
appellate courts tend to trust police officers' recollections of what occurred at the expense 
of the criminal defendant's account. Thus, in the absence of a tape recording, the prosecuting 
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authorities invariably win the swearing contest." Harris v. State, 678 P.2d 397,414 (Alaska 
App. 1984) (Singleton J., concurring and dissenting). 
Consequently, "[i]f an officer's memory of a confession is distorted, inaccurate, or 
incomplete, whether because of the lapse in time or a variety of psychological factors, the 
defendant may be forced into the dilemma of having to waive his right not to testify or 
allowing an erroneous account of the confession to go to the jury." State v. Villarreal, 889 
P.2d 419, 426-27 (Utah 1995). A rule requiring the recording of custodial interrogations 
would serve to protect a defendant's rights and constitute a step forward in the search for 
truth. See Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 506-07 (8th Cir. 1972). 
A. Appellant Challenged the Accuracy of the Statement as Selectively 
"Recorded" by Detective Gent Both in Substance and as to Form. 
As the State has noted, Appellant urges this Court to adopt the narrow rule enunciated 
by the Alaska Supreme Court in Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985). There, the 
court phrased its narrow rule as follows, "the rule that we adopt today requires that custodial 
interrogations in a place of detention, including the giving of the accused's Miranda rights, 
must be electronically recorded." Id.; (Aplee Br. at 12). The State argues that, even if this 
rule were adopted, Appellant's statement would be admissible nonetheless in the instant case 
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because the accuracy of the statement is undisputed. (Aplee Br. at 25-27). However, 
Appellant did dispute the accuracy of the statement at the suppression hearing and at trial 
both in substance and as to form. 
As to form, testimony was elicited at trial indicating that Detective Gent's "record" 
of the interview was incomplete and, therefore, inaccurate. Gent stated that he would type 
a question into his computer as he asked it and then would type Appellant's response "word 
for word." (Tr. Vol. Ill at 24). However, the typed statement did not depict the interaction 
between Appellant and Gent "word for word." For instance, Gent conceded that he likely 
told Appellant to stop or slow down at places because he could not type quickly. (Tr. Vol. 
Ill at 43-44). This interaction was not "recorded." More importantly though, Gent stated 
that there were substantive parts of the interview that he did not record at all. At one point 
Appellant began asking questions and Gent did not type the questions or his answers thereto. 
(Tr. Vol. Ill at 63). 
In this case, Gent chose what parts of the interview to type and what parts to exclude. 
The inculpatory parts of the statement were "recorded," but there is no record of this 
interview or Appellant's statement in its entirety. The "recording" that Gent typed was 
incomplete at best. Consequently, the typed interview did not comport to actual interaction 
between Appellant and Gent. A verbatim recording would have recorded Defendant's 
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questions, would have recorded any requests for clarification from either party, and would 
have recorded the discourse in its entirety. The statement typed by Gent was not a verbatim 
record of this interaction. Rather, it constituted a selective and incomplete record. 
Consequently, as Gent admitted under oath, it was not a verbatim record of the statements 
Appellant made during the subject interview. (Tr. Vol. Ill at 63). Therefore, there is 
testimony in the record indicating that the statement, as typed by Gent, was inaccurate as to 
form. As far as the trial court found that the statement was a verbatim record of the 
interrogation, such finding was clearly erroneous in light of Gent's testimony to the contrary. 
Perhaps more importantly though, Appellant strongly disputed the accuracy of the 
substance of the statement. The State characterizes the statement at issue as a confession. 
(See Aplee Br. at 6). The State, therefore, asserts that the statement constituted a full 
admission of guilt alone sufficient to sustain a conviction as to all elements of the crime 
charged. 
The distinction between a confession and an admission, as applied in criminal 
law, is not a technical refinement, but based upon the substantive differences 
of the character of the evidence educed from each. A confession is a direct 
acknowledgment of guilt on the part of the accused, and, by the very force of 
the definition, excludes an admission, which, of itself, as applied in criminal 
law, is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the 
issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt, 
but of itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction. 
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Riggins v. State, 843 A.2d 115, 126 (Md. App. 2004); (quoting Ford v. State, 29 A.2d 833 
(Md. 1943)). However, Appellant strenuously asserted his innocense both before and during 
trial. Therefore, if the statement constitutes a full admission as to every element at issue as 
the State asserts, it was disputed as to its substantive accuracy. 
The purpose of the trial in the instant case was, of course, to determine whether 
Appellant was guilty of the crime charged. Throughout the course of trial, Appellant 
presented evidence tending to show that he was innocent. To fully reiterate every point in 
the record where Appellant elicited testimony or presented evidence tending to show his 
innocense would be unnecessarily burdensome. Appellant's position was aptly summarized 
in closing argument. He was not guilty of murder because did not intend to kill anyone. He 
lacked the requisite mens rea for the crime charged. {See Tr. Vol. IV at 49). Appellant 
presented testimony regarding various mental infirmities and prior medical instructions to 
support his claim of innocense. (See Tr. Vol. IV at 51,54-57). Where the State characterizes 
the statement as a confession, an admission as to every element of the crime charged, much 
evidence was presented disputing its substantive accuracy. 
Appellant presented evidence calling into question the accuracy of the statement both 
in substance and as to form. The substance of the statement was brought into dispute by the 
evidence presented supporting Appellant's innocence. The form of the statement was also 
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brought into dispute by Detective Gent's own testimony. He conceded that the typed 
statement was not a verbatim record of his interaction with Appellant. Rather it was a 
selective record with substantive omissions. Consequently, the accuracy of the statement was 
disputed and the State's argument in this regard is misplaced. 
B. A Rule Requiring a Verbatim Record of Confessions Where Recording 
Is Feasible Is Essential to Ensuring Fundamental Fairness under the 
Principles of Due Process, 
"A confession - whether true or false - is arguably the most damaging evidence the 
government can present in a trial. As a result, when police elicit a false confession, they are 
likely to cause the wrongful conviction and imprisonment of an innocent person." Richard 
J. Ofshe and Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and 
Irrational Action, 74 Denver U.L. Rev. 979,983-84 (1997) (citing John Wigmore, Evidence 
in Trials at Common Law § 820b, at 303 (James H. Chadbourne ed., 1970)). Consequently, 
the mandates of fundamental fairness require the judicial system to institute whatever 
measures are necessary to ensure that evidence of false or wrongfully obtained confessions 
is not admitted at trial. 
The requirements of fundamental fairness and the coinciding mandates of due process 
are not static. Rather, the jurisprudence as to what is required by due process is constantly 
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evolving. "Due process clearly did not prohibit this process of judicial evolution at the time 
of the framing, and it does not do so today." Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451,462 (2001). 
Courts long held the view espoused by Judge Learned Hand that the reality of an 
innocent man being convicted was an "unreal dream." See United States v. Garrson, 291 F. 
646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). However, the wave of recent exonerations through new 
developments in science and DNA technology brings this conclusion into question. Some 
commentators have estimated that false confessions occur in the United States from "a low 
of 35 up to 840 annually." Barry Scheck, Peter Neufield, Jim Dwer, Actual Innocence 92 
(Doubleday 2000). Regarding exonerations resulting from DNA evidence as compiled by 
the Innocence Project, 23 percent of the convictions were based largely upon false 
confessions. Id. 
The State implies that the procedural safeguards instituted under Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966), andDickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), adequately ensure 
fundamental fairness. (See Aplee. Br. at 20). However, these protections merely protect the 
theoretical procedural fairness of the interrogation process. They do not address the inherent 
fairness of the judicial process that determines whether these procedural safeguards were 
properly applied and whether the confession is itself reliable. Consequently, the verbatim 
recording of interrogations is necessary to ensure that the prophylactic safeguards from 
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Miranda and Dickerson are enforced in a judicial setting. Again, in the absence of such 
safeguards, "trial courts and appellate courts tend to trust police officers' recollections of 
what occurred at the expense of the criminal defendant's account. Thus, in the absence of 
a tape recording, the prosecuting authorities invariably win the swearing contest." Harris, 
678P.2dat414. 
Therefore, as argued in Appellant's opening brief, current safeguards are insufficient 
to assure that the mandates of due process are enforced in a judicial setting. (See Aplt. Br. 
at 12, noting that it is beyond dispute that false confessions still occur; citing State v. 
Mauchley, 67 P.3d 477 (Utah 2003); Aplt. Br. at 13, arguing that there is an amount of 
inherent unreliability that attaches to unrecorded confessions; Aplt. Br. at 13, arguing that 
the State invariably prevails where there is a dispute as to what occurred during an 
unrecorded interrogation; Aplt. Br. at 19 arguing that the dicta in current Utah case law 
inadequately assures the recording of interrogations). 
Appellant further argued that the current case law, merely encouraging recording, is 
insufficient to ensure that a defendant's rights are adequately protected. (Aplt. Br. at 19; 
citing Villarreal 889 P.2d at 426; State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 891 (Utah 1989); State v. 
James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1018 (Utah App. 1993)). Appellant also argued that the verbatim 
recording of interrogations in places of detention where recording is feasible is necessary to 
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assure defendants the protections of due process. Consequently, Appellant demonstrated in 
his opening brief that current safeguards do adequately address and protect the right to due 
process and that the adoption of Appellant's proposed rule is, therefore, a necessary 
precaution. 
The State summarily asserts that Appellant failed to demonstrate that current 
procedural safeguards are insufficient to ensure the mandates of due process. (Aplee. Br. at 
16). However, as previously established, Appellant did challenge the sufficiency of current 
safeguards and argued that recording was necessary to fulfill the requirements of due process. 
The State fails to demonstrate how the safeguards currently in place, where the failure to 
record interrogations is common, adequately ensures fundamental fairness. Appellant fully 
described the inadequacies of the current state of the law and argued that the current 
inadequacy was one policy factor that this Court should consider. The fact that Appellant 
later detailed many policy factors in favor of adopting said rule does not vitiate his first 
argument that current safeguards are constitutionally inadequate. (See e.g. Aplt. Br. at 12, 
13, 19). 
The recording of custodial interrogations protects the rights of the accused and ensures 
that the trial court has a full and complete record upon which to determine whether the 
mandates of Miranda and Dickerson were complied with. However, a recording also 
-11-
protects the interests of the State and the individual interests of police officers wrongfully 
accused of improper interrogation tactics. In many cases, a verbatim recording could confirm 
the voluntariness of a confession and, in all cases, it would help courts ascertain the truth of 
what occurred in an interrogation behind closed doors. (Geller, Videotaping Interrogations 
and Confessions, National Institute of Justice, March 1993). The demonstrated inadequacies 
of current procedural safeguards coupled with these important policy considerations 
indicating that a recording requirement is essential, demonstrates that the rule proposed 
herein should be adopted as an element of due process under the Constitution of the State of 
Utah. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse his 
conviction under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of August, 2004. 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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